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Great Expectations, Predictable Outcomes and the G20's Response to the Recent 
Global Financial Crisis: When Matters Relating to Liquidity Risks Become 
Equally as Important as Measures Addressing Pro cyclicality.
ABSTRACT
The meeting of the Governors and Heads of Supervision on the 12 September 2010, their decisions  
in relation to the new capital framework known as Basel III, as well as the endorsement of the  
agreements  reached on the 26 July  2010,  once again,  reflect  the typical  situation  where  great  
expectations  with  rather  unequivocal,  and in  a  sense,  disappointing  results  are  delivered.  The 
outcome of various consultations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, consultations  
which culminated in the present Basel III framework, also reflect the focus on measures aimed at  
addressing problems attributed to Basel II, that is, measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclicality.  
This is rather astonishing given one critical lesson which has been drawn from the recent Financial  
Crisis: namely, that capital measures on their own, were and are insufficient in addressing and 
averting  the  Financial  Crisis.  Furthermore,  banks  which  have  been  complying  with  capital  
adequacy requirements could still face severe liquidity problems.
As well as an increase of the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%, the recent  
agreement and decisions of the Governors and Heads of Supervision also include the stipulation  
that banks hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% - hence consolidating the stronger definition  
of capital (as agreed in the previous meeting held by the Governors and Heads of Supervision  
earlier in July 2010).
Key  Words:  Pro  cyclicality,  liquidity,  capital,  Basel  III,  countercyclical,  forward  looking 
provisioning, financial regulation, financial crises.
This paper considers and highlights why matters related to pro cyclicality and capital measures 
should not constitute the sole focus of attention of the G20's initiatives. In so doing , it kicks off 
with a section which introduces the topic “pro cyclicality”, a subsequent section which is aimed at 
highlighting the importance of liquidity risks, and a third section which highlights the degree of 
prominence  that  the  G201 has  accorded  to  these  respective  issues:  namely  pro  cyclicality  and 
liquidity risks. Having considered these aims, the paper finalises with a concluding section.
I. Pro cyclicality
Pro cyclicality is a term used to denote the tendency for periods of financial/economic downturns or 
booms to be further exacerbated by certain economic policies.
An example of a “fundamental” source of pro cyclicality as provided by the Committee of the 
European Banking Supervisors(CEBS),2 is attributed to “excessive risk-taking during periods of 
expansion, which results in the build up of vulnerabilities”.
Recommendations Put Forward and Highlighted as Means of Addressing Pro cyclicality 
The Basel Committee has proposed the building up of buffers aimed at addressing and mitigating 
pro cyclical  effects  through a  combination  of  counter  cyclical  capital  charges,  forward-looking 
provisioning and capital conservation measures.
The promotion of financial stability through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes 
one of Basel II’s primary objectives.3 However some problems identified with Basel II are attributed 
to pro cyclicality and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the trading book are adequately 
1The Group of 20 (Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors) works and collaborates with international bodies 
such as the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
2  Furthermore, the CEBS defines pro cyclicality as comprising “mechanisms through which the financial system can 
amplify business fluctuations that are particularly disruptive during an economic downturn or when the financial 
system is faced with pressures.” See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter 
Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at page 34
3  For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 of 47
accounted for in the current capital  requirements.4 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II has been 
criticised  since  “capital  requirements  for credit  risk as  a  probability of  default  of  an exposure 
decreases in the economic upswing and increases during the downturn”5 – hence resulting in capital 
requirements which fluctuate over the cycle. Other identified6 consequential effects include the fact 
that fluctuations in such capital requirements may result in credit institutions raising their capital 
during periods when its is costly7 for them to implement such a rise – which has the potential of 
inducing banks to cut back on their lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive capital requirements 
should have pro cyclical effects principally on undercapitalised banks.”8
Regulators will be able to manage systemic risks to the financial system during such periods when 
firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend where more market participants such as 
credit rating agencies, could be engaged in the supervisory process. The Annex to Pro cyclicality in 
the Accompanying Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive9 not only importantly 
emphasises the fact that regulatory capital requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of 
how much  capital  banks  should  hold,  but  also  highlights  the  role  of  credit  rating  agencies  in 
compelling banks to increase their capital levels even where such institution may be complying with 
regulatory requirements.
Even though the implementation of higher levels of capital buffers could serve as a means for the 
management of systemic risks, liquidity requirements have also been acknowledged by many as 
having a fundamental role to play in mitigating contagion – hence assuming a role which is similar 
to that of capital buffers. The link between counter cyclical buffers, capital and liquidity standards is 
further demonstrated through the impact which is generated as a result of the implementation of 
capital and liquidity standards. Counter cyclical buffer schemes could serve as means of enhancing 
4  See ibid at page 23 of 47
5  See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 of 47
6  As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. 
See page 46 of 47
7 Liquidity, a topic which will be addressed in the second section of this paper, is also considered to be “highly pro 
cyclical, growing in good times and drying up in times of stress.” During the build up to the present crisis, banks and 
other financial  institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost  of holding liquidity.  See Report  of the Financial 
Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System “Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” at page 
24 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
8  See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 150
9  Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47
the following effects which are generated by higher capital and liquidity standards, namely:10
- Making the financial system more resilient and:
- Reducing the amplitude of the business cycles within the financial system.
The association between systemic  risks  and liquidity risks  and the rather  apparent  lack  of  due 
recognition accorded to liquidity risks under Basel II, constituted other reasons (apart from pro 
cyclicality) for the growing criticism of Basel II.
II. Liquidity Risk
The definition of liquidity,  as provided by the Bank of International Settlements  (BIS),  is  “the 
ability  of  a  bank  to  fund increases  in  assets  and  meet  obligations  as  they come  due,  without 
incurring unacceptable losses.  The fundamental  role  of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of 
an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.”11
In their  report  on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial  System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the recent financial 
crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions, was to a 
large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.”12 This has resulted in an “increasingly important role 
for liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.”13 Furthermore, the 
FSF  highlighted  the  urgency  of  both  authorities,  namely,  supervisors  (in  their  monitoring  of 
liquidity risks at banks) and central banks (in their design and implementation of market operations) 
collaborating in order to “ restore the functioning of inter bank lending markets.”14
As identified in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, “the specific knowledge that banks possess 
10  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements Publications August 2010 at page 5 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
11  Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 at page 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
12Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk”  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
13 ibid
14 „In order to counter the transfer of funding liquidity risk by systemically important financial institutions to the 
public sector“ ;ibid
about their borrowers make bank loans particularly illiquid.”15 The connection between liquidity 
and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates on possible consequences 
resulting  from a  bank’s  failure,  namely:16 The  “destruction”  of  such specific  knowledge which 
banks have about  their  borrowers and the reduction of  “the common pool  of  liquidity.”17 Such 
reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also trigger the failure of other banks – with the 
result that i) the value of such illiquid bank assets diminishes and ii) further problems within the 
banking systems are aggravated.18
“Endogenous risks” could also be generated depending on the type of information which the bank 
possesses about their borrowers and how the dissipation of such information to the public, if it has 
the potential to trigger a bank run, can be prevented.
According Greater Attention to Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many banks 
had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management during 
periods of abundant liquidity.19
An  extensive  review  of  its  2000  “Sound  Practices  for  Managing  Liquidity  in  Banking 
Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of addressing matters and 
issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial Crises.20 
In  order  to  consolidate  on  the BCBS  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  
Supervision  of September 2008, which should lead to improved management and supervision of 
liquidity  risks  of  individual  banks,  supervisory  bodies  will  be  required  “to  develop  tools  and 
policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at the aggregate level”.21
In responding to the apparent gaps which exist with Basel II – as revealed by the recent crises, 
15   “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?
a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64f at page 137
16  ibid 
17  ibid
18  ibid
19  Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision  Sept 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>
20 ibid
21 See Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
proposals which are aimed at imposing penalties for the occurrence of maturity mismatches22 have 
been  put  forward.23 The  degree  of  disparity  which  exists  between  the  maturity  of  assets  and 
liabilities  is  crucial  to  determining  the  state  of  a  company’s  liquidity.  Such penalties  aimed at 
deterring the occurrence of maturity mismatches could include “higher capital  requirements  for 
banks which finance their assets with overnight borrowing from the money markets than banks 
which finance similar assets with term deposits.”24
The inability  of  bank  capital,  on  its  own,  to  address  funding  and liquidity  problems has  been 
acknowledged by  many  academics.  As  a  result,  further  proposals,  in  addition  to  the  above 
mentioned  amendment  to  Basel  II,  have  been  put  forward.  These  include  the  coupling  of  the 
existing regulatory framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms.
III. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
Basel III and Recent Efforts to Address Pro Cyclical Effects of Basel II
In response to the recent Financial Crisis and to the realisation that capital levels (which banks 
operated with) during the period of the Crisis were insufficient and also lacking in quality,25 the 
Basel Committee responded by raising the quality of capital – as well as its level.26
Further consequences of the recent Basel reforms also include:27 
A tightening of the definition of common equity
Limitation of what qualifies as Tier 1 capital
An introduction of a harmonised set of prudential filters
The enhancement of transparency and market discipline through new disclosure requirements.”
The introduction of Basel II resulted in changes being made to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to 
22  A situation which could occur where an undertaking possesses more short term liabilities than short term asset. 
It could also occur where more assets are held (than liabilities) for medium and long term obligations.
23  See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 
at page 148 and particularly Brunnermeier et al whose proposal includes the requirement of greater capital, “not 
only against the risk of assets, but also against the risk of funding such assets.”
24  Ibid at 148
25  “Such a lack in high quality capital resulted in the raised levels of capitals and de leveraging of trading books (by 
many banks) amidst the Crisis.” See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial  Stability Framework“ Bank for 
International Settlements Publications, page 10 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
26  see ibid at page 11
27  ibid
provide for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk.28 This was introduced into Basel II in 
view of  the  realisation  that  “the  optimal  balance  may differ  significantly  across  banks.”29 The 
increased  focus  on  risk  (and  particularly  credit  risk),  resulted  from growing  realisation  of  the 
importance of risk within the financial sector. The range of approaches to credit risk – as introduced 
under Basel II, and which also exists for market risk, consists of the standardised approach (which 
is the simplest of the three broad approaches), the internal ratings based (IRB) foundation approach 
and the IRB advanced approach.30
Under the standardised approach, regulatory capital requirements are more closely aligned and in 
harmony  with  the  principal  elements  of  banking  risk  –  owing  to  the  introduction  of  wider 
differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of techniques which are applied in mitigating 
risk.31 
However problems with Basel II internal credit risk models (which relate to the fact such banks’ 
internal credit risk models were overly sensitive in their implementation32 for the calculation of 
regulatory capital,  and generated pro cyclical  effects)  were realised during the recent  Financial 
Crisis – as particularly exemplified by the case of Northern Rock. 
Do the recent Basel  III  efforts  reflect  a situation where some apparent lessons from the recent 
Financial  Crisis  have deliberately been ignored by the G20, or is  it  yet  another case of typical 
summits which generate great expectations but fail  to deliver the expected and correspondingly 
expected results?
IV. Conclusion
Whilst efforts taken by the Committee appear to have focussed on capital – as evidenced by its 
Consultative  Document  on  Counter  Cyclical  Capital  Buffer  Proposal,  more  forward  looking 
28  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Standard Approach to Credit Risk, 
Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf>
29  ibid
30  ibid;  see also Basel  Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “The Internal  Ratings Based 
Approach”  Supporting  Document  to  the  New  Basel  Capital  Accord”  January  2001  Bank  for  International 
Settlements Publications <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>
31 As a result, the standardised approach was intended to “generate capital ratios which were more aligned with the 
actual  economic risks that  banks are facing, compared to the 1988 Basel Accord – which should improve  banks’ 
incentives to enhance their risk measurement and management capabilities and which should also reduce incentives for 
regulatory capital arbitrage.”
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Standard Approach to Credit Risk, 
Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf>
32  In their implementation to facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine the 
level of capital which large banks must retain.”
provisions – as well as provisions which at are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems 
attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans”, would be greatly 
welcomed. To an extent, this move could address the problem attributed to liquidity risks.
Further,  the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has acknowledged that tools 
which could be implemented as measures for mitigating cyclicality, exist beyond those measures 
proposed by the Basel Committee. As a result, it has taken up initiatives in relation to measures 
such as dynamic provisioning and supplementary measures which include leverage ratios.33
Recent  efforts  aimed  at  addressing  the  Fianancial  Crisis  also  include  two  new  liquidity 
requirements, namely,  the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), 
respectively serve the purposes of “ensuring that banks have adequate funding liquidity to survive 
one month of difficult funding conditions (the LCR), and to address the mismatches between the 
maturity  of  a  bank’s  assets  and  that  of  its  liabilities  (the  NSFR).”34 Whilst  such  liquidity 
requirements would help to address the critical issues arising as a result of maturity mismatches, the 
implementation of counter cyclical capital buffers – as well as these new liquidity requirements 
(LCR and NSFR) would be bolstered by introducing more forward looking provisions.
Despite the above liquidity- related efforts, the results and efforts relating to liquidity risks do not 
correspond to its overwhelming contribution to the recent Financial Crisis. Neither do they accord 
justice to its significance. The G20's response to recent Crisis could also be regarded as a case 
aimed at appeasing the needs and demands of various jurisdictions – in relation to those who had 
favoured tougher rules and those who had appealed for not too stringent rules. Whilst such tendency 
to appease the needs of different jurisdictions may serve as a formidable weapon in achieving the 
goal  of  regulatory  convergence,  it  may also  serve  as  a  hindrance  in  the  realisation  of  the  all 
importance objective of deterring regulatory arbitrage.
Furthermore, given the urgency of addressing liquidity risks and maturity mismatches, the transition 
periods for implementing the two new liquidity requirements are questionable – even though as 
with capital, consideration is to be had to the impact of limited transition periods. 
33 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
page 2 http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-
countercyclical-capital-b.aspx
34 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital  and  Liquidity  Requirements”  Bank  for  International  Settlements  Publications  August  2010  at  page  7 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>

